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1 - Privatization Operations 
Performed by BNDESPAR 
Determining Motives 	  
1. Introduction 
BNDES —The Brazilian National Development Bank — has two fully-owned 
subsidiaries, FINAME and BNDESPAR, which together comprise the BNDES Sys-
tem. FINAME provides finance for machinery and equipment, and BNDESPAR is 
the holding company responsible for conducting the System's operations on the 
Brazilian stock exchanges, as well as acting as a merchant bank. 
Over the past few years, BN DESPAR has undertaken the work of returning com-
panies, the control of whose voting shares was temporarily in the hands of the 
BN D ES System, to the private  sector. The takeover of these companies resulted from 
the fai lure of the previous owners in their administration. 
Having acquired experience through the various operations it carried out, 
BNDESPAR went on to reprivatize two companies of the Siderbrás group, acting 
as a merchant bank for this state-owned steel holding. 
2. Background 
BNDESPAR was formed in July 1982, resulting from a merger which replaced 
three previously existing holding subsidiaries of BNDES, which had been created 
in 1975 as part of the then government policy to reinforce the equity of Brazilian 
industries. 
At that time, the emerging and expanding industrial park, encouraged by the 
economic policy of import substitution, was already receiving loans from BNDES 
and FINAME, complemented by international finance. However, dueto the inabil-


















create a government agency (BNDESPAR) which could acquire shares issued by 
these companies, in order to help them build up and maintain a healthy capital struc-
tu re. 
The intention of BNDESPAR, when acquiring these shares, was to resell them 
on the Brazilian stock market, once the company had become attractive to inves-
tors. 
Dueto the economic crisis of the late seventies, which continued during the 
first of the eighties, many companies already receiving financial support from 
BNDES and BNDESPAR began to present serious problems of liquidity and profita-
bility, requiring further cash injections to avoid their bankruptcy, which in some 
cases entailed the take over of complete control by the BNDES System. 
CHART I 
Companies taken over by the BNDES System 
COMPANIES SECTOR SIZE SE 
FORM 
YEAR 
Caraiba Metais S.A. Copper Mining 
& Meta lu rg. Large BA 1974 
Celpag • Cia. Guatapará de Papel e Celulose Paper & Pulp Large SP 1981 
CCB • Cia. de Celulose da Bahia Paper & Pulp Large BA 1978 
CBC • Cia. Brasileira do Cobre Mining Medium RS 1974 
Cia. Nacional de Tecidos Nova América Textiles Large RJ 1985 
Cosinor • Cia. Siderúrgica do Nordeste Steel Large PE 1982 
Mafersa S.A. Capital Goods Large SP 1964 
Máquinas Piratininga S.A. Capital Goods Small SP 1982 
Máquinas Piratininga do Nordeste S.A. Capital Goods Small PE 1982 
Sibra • Eletrosiderúrgica Brasileira S.A. Ferro•Alloys Large BA 1982 
* Size: small: annual turnover up to US$ 50 million 
medium: annual turnover up to US$ 100 million 
large: annual turnover more than US$ 100 million 
In addition, BNDES and BNDESPAR became increasingly involved in the 
companies show below ( Chart II ), due to high levels of debt or stock participa-
tion. 
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TYPE OF COMPANY 
Companies shown in 
Charts 1 & 11 
New investments 
	
548.0 	 52.0 
506.2 48.0 



















Non-controlled enterprises with considerable BNDES 
System's investment and equity participation 
COMPANIES SECTOR SIZE SF SHAREHOLDING 
Aracruz Celulose S.A. Paper & Pulp Large ES Control shared among BNDESPAR and other 
groups, regulated by shareholder agr. 
Cimetal Siderurgia S.A. Steel Large MG Control shared between BNDES and BDMG(1); 
company in process ai asset-stripping 
Cobra - Computadores e Sistemas 
Brasileiros S.A. 
Computers Large RJ Control shared among BNDES, Bank of Brazil 
and CEF Ql. 
CRN - Cia. Riograndense de 
Nitrogenados 







Control shared among BNDESPAR, Petrofértil 
and Rio Grande do Sul State; 
company in process of asset-stripping, 
No controlling stake, but effective control due 
to the BNDES System holding 53% ai total 
capital, 38,4% oi voting capital and 80% cif debt. 
Usiminas Mecânica S.A. - Usimec Capital Goods Medium MG BNDES took control after separation from 
the Usiminas Steel VVorks. 
(1) BDMG — The Development Bank of the State of Minas Gerais 
(2) CEF — The Federal Savings Bank 
3. 1982/85 - Performance of BNDESPAR 
As a consequence of the above mentioned financial involvement, over 50°/0 
of the total investments of BNDESPAR during this period, were allocated to the 
companies shown in Charts I & II. The criticai financial and, in some cases, opera-
tional situations of these companies, meant that the major part of BN DESPAR's task 
force had to be involved in their management. 
CHART III 
Investments in securities made by BNDESPAR from 1982/85 















BNDESPAR investments — yearly basis 
In% 
TYPE OF COMPANY 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Companies shown in 
Charts I & II 49 42 59 69 
New investments 51 58 41 31 
Total 100 100 100 100 
As can be seen above, new investments were relegated to second place, pre-
venting BNDESPAR from fulfilling its real role 
3.1. Financial performance of companies shown in Charts I & II 
Despite considerable on-going financial support and managerial back up from 
the BNDES System, between 1982 and 1985, the majority of these companies, with 
the notable exception of Aracruz Celulose, failed to become competitive and profit-
making, basically for the following reasons: 
a) the difficulties of guaranteeing professional management and setting up 
an adequate human resources policy; 
b) the difficulties of operating a state company in competitive markets, when 
faced with reduced management flexibility; and 
c) the difficulties of maintaining a stable price policy for products, when fa-
ced with economic policies that used state companies as instruments for combat-
ting the growth of inflation. 
In addition, the h igh levei of involvement in the management of these com-
panies proved to be a drain on the human resources of BNDESPAR. 
3.2. Impact of losses shown by companies in Charts I & II on BNDESPAR's finan-
cial report 
As a result of the unhealthy financial position of these companie, BN DES-














BNDESPAR losses 1982/85 
In US$ million 
tossis 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Yearly losses 1118.31 (121.4) (191.0) (51.7) 
As a fully owned subsidiary of BNDES, these losses were consequently trans-
ferred, in their entirety, to the BNDES financial report. 
4. BNDESPAR's performance from 1986 onwards 
As a means of solving the problem once and for all, BNDESPAR Iaunched 
an extensive reprivatization programme, with an aim to restructuring its assets, rein-
forci ng its capital structure and channel ing the work of its managerial team back 
towards its original objectives. Consequently, second half of the eighties produced 
a market reversal in BNDESPAR's financial performance. 
Chart VI shows the reduction of BNDESPAR's investments in the companies 
shown in Charts I & II, and the consequent redirection of funds into new investments 
with in the private sector. 
CHART VI 
BNDESPAR investments: 1985;89 
In % 
INVESTMENTS 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Companies shown in Charts I & II 69 32 45 11 1 
I nyestments in new companies 31 68 55 89 99 
As a consequence of this strategy, BNDESPAR was able to successfully re-














BNDESPAR profits and losses: 1986/89 
In IS milito 
PROFITS AND LOSSES 1986 1987 1988 1989 
IYearly losses)!Yearly profits (704.7) (94.91 58.9 919.4 
This success, obtained in the implementation of its privatization programme, 
resulted in BNDESPAR being contracted by the state-owned steel holding Sider-
brás, to act in the privatization of its subsidiaries Cofavi and Usiba. 
5. Results of the BNDESPAR Privatization Programme 
BNDESPAR managed the successful privatization of 13 companies, two of 
which control led by Siderbrás. These operations, carried out between June 1987 
and December 1989, raised funds of around US$ 556 million. 
This amount reflects the proceeds from the safes, and does not include the 
I iabilities transferred along with the companies to the new shareholders. These lia-
bi lities amounted to almost US$ 500 million, most of which are held by BNDES 
in form of credits. 
The financial and operational revitalization of BNDESPAR and the privatized 
companies clearly shows the correctness of the policies adopted. These compa-
nies, once freed from the straight-jacket of state control, aggravated by the cronic 
shortage of public investment funds, have regained the capacity for growth. 
Annex I itemizes, company by company, the privatization operations carried 

































II - The BNDESPAR Experience 	  
1. Introduction 
BNDESPAR began its privatization operations after a presidential decree in 
November 1985, gradual ly developing standard procedures through the experience 
acquired, especially in terms of: 
—the realease of information to the Congress, the Trade Unions, and the public 
in general; 
— providing detailed legal and technical information concerning the com-
pany for safe to potential investors; and 
— outlining the general conditions of execution all of which information was 
included in a special prospectus produced for each privatization process. 
Despite the development of certain standard practices, it is importam to stress 
that each case received its own independent treatment. 
2. Identification of critica! points 
Many of the companies to be privatized presented special difficulties which 
needed to be solved to prevent future problems arising. These included: 
2.1. Requirement for financial restructuring 
Wherever possible, BNDESPAR promoted the financial restructuring of high 
leverage companies, or those with large loans already due, or shortly falling due, 
as a means of increasing their appeal to investors, and consequently the chances 
of a better safes price. 
2.2. Adverse affect on safe price of statuatory restrictions 
In cases where certain clauses in shareholders agreements or company acts 
were harmful to the company's appeal to investors, BNDESPAR aimed at the alter-













pies of companies in which this was done are: Aracruz Celulose, Sibra Eletrosiderúr-
gica and Cia. de Celulose da Bahia — CCB. 
2.3. Restructuring through mergers or breaking up operations 
In cases where the merging or breaking up the units of a company made it 
more attractive for safe, BNDESPAR undertook such operations. Examples of this 
include: Caraíba Metais, where the copper smelting, mining and phosphoric acid 
units were separated; and Cimetal Siderurgia, which was put into statuatory receiver-
ship prior to its asset stripping. 
2.4. The creation of shares with special rights 
The requirement of transferring certain commitments to the new owners led 
BNDESPAR to create a new type of shares, similar to the "Golden Shares" issued 
in the U.K. privatization projects. The best example of this is Caraíba Metais — in 
which a category of shares with special rights was created with a view to guaran-
teeing the continued of copper to small firms. 
2.5. Legal claims of shareholders prior to privatization 
Many companies scheduled for reprivatization had minority shareholders in-
terested in recuperating previous losses through legal action. Examples of this in-
clude: Cimetal, CCB and Cosinor, al I of which cases were won by BNDESPAR, ena-
bling it to proceed with the reprivatization processes. 
2.6. Publicizing the programme 
During the initial phase, BN DESPAR failed to appreciate the ful I importance 
of explaining the benefits of the programme to the relevant sectors of society. This 
created additional problems, culminating with BNDESPAR being summoned by 
the national Congress to explain the privatization process of the largest Brazilian 
pulp company, Aracruz Celulose. 
These experience led to the, adoption of a new publicity policy, first im-
plemented in the Caraíba Metais process. 
The new publicity material included, in addition to the necessary legal and 
technical detai Is, information accessible to the general public, covering the com-
pany background, the argumenta in favourof its privatization, occasional losses sus-
tained by government etc. 
This information was widely divulged in the national press, and even the 
detailed prospectuses for each privatization process were distributed free charge 


















2.7 Necessary contacts prior to privatization 
Throughout the privatization programme, BNDESPAR maintained constant 
contact with relevant entities, including Trade Unions, Confederations of Industry, 
and in particular with Congressmen, so as to remain open to the expectations and 
aspirations of ali those invoived. 
An example of the benefits of th is policy, was the endorsement by Abranfe 
— the association of smal I copper producers — of the creation of a special class 
of shares issued by Caraíba Metais (see paragraph 2.4). 
In spite of the adoption of these procedures, difficulties arose in the attempt 
to privatize Mafersa (a railway equipment company), when the President of the 
Republic suspended the process, dueto political tu rbu lence surrounding the case, 
exacerbated by the proximity of the elections for president in November 1989. 
3. Methods of Share Sales 
Before arriving ata conclusion, BNDESPAR analysed the following options: 
METHOD OF 
SHARE SALE 
Sale of controlling or 
total shares, in one block 
Sale of controlling or 
total shares in several blocks, 
permitting group ownership 
Sale of controlling or total 
shares, in one or several blocks on 
the Stock Exchange 
Public offer of controlling 




Prior vetting oi candidates 
Prior vetting of candidates 
No prior vetting of candidates 
No prior vetting of candidates 
TYPE 
OF BID 
Auction or sealed bid, 
with minimum price 
Auction or sealed bid 
with minimum price 
Auction with minimum 
price, using the Securities 
Distribution System 





Management or management 
employee buyouts 
No prior vetting of candidates Price negotiable 
Sale of cession of pre.emptive 
rights on unpaid new capital 
issue shares 
Asset stripping 
Prior vetting or not oi candidates 
Prior veting or not of candidates 
Auction or sealed bid, 
with minimum price 
Auction or sealed bid, 





















3.1. Deciding factors when selecting sale method 
The sale of shares in one block, with prior vetting of candidates, was the 
method most frequently adopted by BNDESPAR, as in the majority of cases the firms 
either showed poor profits or no profits at ali. However certain other deciding fac-
tors should be mentioned: 
a) Shareholders agreements or the provisions of company acts sometimes im-
posed the adoption of certain methods of sale, while excluding others. Aracruz Celu-
lose, Sibra and CCB are examples of this. 
In the case of the highly profitable pulp company ARACRUZ, the shareholders 
agreement obliged BNDESPAR to draw up a new one, to be agreed on with the 
existing shareholders, and which required common stock to be auctioned off in 
a single block, to the exclusion of other options, with the obligation that the future 
shareholder adhere to the agreement. 
In the case of Sibra, the largest Brazilian ferro-alloy company, BNDESPAR was 
obliged to engage in exhaustive negotiations with the japanese partners, Nippon 
Kokan and Marubeni Corporation, to arrive at an agreement on the form and con-
ditions of sale. 
In the case of the Companhia de Celulose da Bahia — CCB, a pulp company, 
which for technical and financial reasons had temporarily suspended its operations, 
BNDESPAR had to carry out the sale respecting the statuatory rights of the previ-
ous majority shareholder, which gave him the priority for 60 days to purchase the 
shares at the price of the winning bid. 
b) The prior vetting of candidates was adopted in 12 out of the 13 operations 
carried out, so as to ensure that the interested parties had the appropriate techn i-
cal capacity and financial situation, and conformed to the existing regulations re-
quiring that they hold Brazilian nationality or residence status. 
The exception was the asset stripping of Cimetal, a steel and pig iron compa-
ny whose operations were temporarily suspended, in which case BNDESPAR con-
sidered that the sale of the assets separately would be much more attractive than 
the sale of the company as a whole, consequently deciding to put the company into 
receivership. 
3.2. Some additional sales methods adopted 
a) In the case of Companhia Brasileira do Cobre — CBC, a producer of con-
centrated copper, a management employee buyout was effected, due to the lack 
of interest shown in the auction organized for the sale of the company. 
b) Caraíba Metais, which originally included copper mining and smelting, 
was split up for the sale in two separate companies. The smelting company, which 
was much more attractive to investors, was put up for sale immediately, and the min-













c) In the case of Siderúrgica N.S. Aparecida, a producer of special steel, 
BNDESPAR sold the company via the ceding of pre-emptive rights on unpaid new 
capital issue shares. Although BNDESPAR did not hold the majority voting shares, 
it undertook the process of privatizing the company, as over 50% of the total capi-
tal, nearly 40% of the voting capital, and 80% of the company's debt was held by 
the BNDES System. Through this method, the previous shareholders (including 
BNDESPAR) agreed to become minority shareholders, in the interests of a more 
favourable future sale price. 
4. Criteria for fixing the amount of shares to be offered for sale 
As under current Brazilian legislation, the voting capital may be represented 
by one third of the company's total capital, it is possible to assume the effective con-
trol of a company by holding 17% of its total capital. 
For this reason, in each case BNDESPAR was able to choose what percentage 
of shares should be offered for sale. The choice was based on the following con-
siderations: 
a) An assessment of the financial standing of the interested parties in relation 
to the size of the concern to be privatized; and 
b) the prospecta for favourable future sale of the shares retained on the Stock 
Exchange. 
In addition, considering the fact that the majority of these companies had 
received loans from BNDES, BNDESPAR was in a position to opt for partial domes-
tic debt equity swaps, in the interest of obtaining better conditions of sale. This was 
done in the cases of Caraíba Metais and Cosinor, among others. 
5. Sale conditions 
a) To encourage a large number of applicants, in most cases up to 70% of the 
payment could be paid over a certain period, as foliows: payment of principal wi-
thin 10 years, with a one gear grace period; 12% interest p.a. over and above mone-
tary correction; and the requirement of a bank guarantee equal to the outstanding 
amount (this requirement bei ng dispensed in the case of Aracruz, whose shares, 
widely traded on the stock market, were accepted in its place). 
b) In accordance with one of the basic arguments in favour of the privatiza-













panies under its control, in many cases BNDESPAR offered the possibi I ity of finance 
for new investments in expansion and modernization, subject to a prior feasibility 
analysis. 
c) A new shareholders agreement in the case of unlisted companies, obl ig-
ing the company to negotiate its shares on the Brazilian Stock Exchange within a 
certain period, was drawn up in cases when BNDESPAR retained shares after the 
privatization. In some cases, previously existing agreements with other shareholders 
also had to be respected. 
d) To further encourage a large number of applicants, in ali cases of the safe 
of shares, BNDESPAR took on the responsibi I ity for the payment of any unforeseen 
I iabi I ities over and above 2% of the company's total assets. 
6. Vetting of interested parties 
As a rule the requisite qual ifications were as follows: 
a) Participants should be Brazilian residents (i.e. Brazilian or foreign citizens 
domiciled in Brazil); 
b)corporate entities should be registered and have their head office in Brazil, 
and their effective control be held, directly or indirectly, by Brazilian residents; 
c) proof of their standing with the tax authorities; 
d) the submission of the requisite documents, including audited balance 
sheets, company acts, etc.; and 
e) a Bank letter of intention guaranteeing the outstanding amount in cases 
when payment was to be made over a certain period. 
Reais (a) to (c) were requirements of existing legislation. An exception occurred 
in the case of Ci metal, due to the fact that the company was in a process of I iqu ida-
tion when the safe of assets was carried out. 
7. Participation of foreign capital 
Foreign capital participation was always permitted, but only asa minority hold-
ing, either through joint ventures or consortiums. In the case of a consortium, fo-
reign investors were not given the option, offered to Brazilia n i nvestors, to pay over 
a certain period. 
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In the case of the privatization of Mafersa, the option of share purchase via 
DFAs — Deposit Facility Agreements, a bond issued by the Brazilian Central Bank 
to cover unpaid foreign bank loans — was foreseen for foreign investors. 
8. The fixing of minimum safe price 
The fixing of the minimum share price was always done by a private consul-
tancy company hired through public tender. 
The company's projected discounted cash flow was the criteria most frequen-
tly adopted. 
The two exceptions to the above were: 
a) Celpag — Companhia Guatapará de Celulose e Papel — an uncompleted 
project for a paper and pulp plant in the State of São Paulo; and 
b) Cimetal Siderurgia which, as already seen, was in a process of liquidation. 
Considering the exceptional ci rcumstances, an assessment of total assets replaced 
projected discounted cash flow as the criteria adopted. 
9. Public share offer of minority stakes 
9.1. To employees 
In all cases of share safes in going concerns, the conditions of safe included 
the offer of a predetermined percentage of the shares to the employees. This was 
always done after privatization, either undertaken directly by BNDESPAR or by the 
new owners, the shares always being offered on favourable conditions. 
9.2. On the stock exchanges 
The most commonly adopted method was the safe of shares on the stock ex-
change through open auction. 
The most significant example of this was the block trade of shares of Sibra 
Eletrosiderúrgica Brasileira, carried out after privatization, in which BNDESPAR sold 
shares it held in the company, amounting to 36% of the total company capital, 
representing 53% of the non-voting shares. 



















9.3. Public share offers 
An example of this type of operation was the public offer at a fixed price of 
10% of the non-voting capital of Aracruz Celulose, undertaken by BNDESPAR a 
few months after the safe of the voting shares of the company. These shares were 
purchased by 7860 investors, at a maximum value of US$ 5000 per person. 
The BNDES System had already acquired significant experience in this type 
of operation through the public offer of its shares in Petrobrás, the government-
owned petrol monopoly, in December 1985, envolving a total of US$ 300 million, 
bei ng purchased by 320,000 investors, ata maximum value of US$ 5000 per person. 
10. Sealed bid offer versus auction 
After an initial phase in which four privatization processes were carried out 
via sealed bid offers, BNDESPAR gave preference to safe by auction. This form of 
safe was considered the most appropriate because it permits the safe price to be 
raised publicly. 
11. Auditing the privatization processes 
In ali cases independent auditing firms were contracted, with the following 
objectives: 
a) To guarantee the good faith of the operation; 
b) to centralize the supply of information to interested parties, to accompany 
their visits to the companies concerned, and to ensure fair treatment; 
c) to attend the meetings between interested parties and the private consul-
tancy firms, to guarantee fair treatment for ali applicants; 
In the later privatizations, it was decided to promote meetings to allow interest-
ed parties direct access to the private consultancy firms, with the intention of provid-
ing potential investors with the premises on which the cónsultancy firms analysis 
was based, without however divulging the study itself; 
d) and finally, to attend the meetings of the BNDES privatization committee. 
12. Internai procedures 
An internai privatization committee was appointed in each privatization 
process. These were general ly made up of eight experienced executives from the 













The committees were responsible for presenting all the proposals relating to 
each privatization process to the directors, including the solution of critical points, 
forms of safe, vettingof applicants, minimum safes prices etc. In the case of this last, 
the committee had power to disagree with the price recommended by the consul-
tancy com pany. 
13. Stages of privatization operations 
In general the stages of a privatization process were as fol lows: 
a)H iring, via public tender, of the independent auditing and consultancy firms; 
b) setting up the BNDES privatization committee; 
c)evaluation of critical points in each case, which could later complicate or 
even prevent the success of the privatization; 
d) publication of Sales Notices, containing detailed information relating to 
the privatization process, including a schedule of activities, a summary of informa-
tion about the company concerned, additional technical and financial information 
bei ng available free of charge on request; 
e) publication of the minimum safes price; 
f) publication of the Iist of approved candidates; 
g) presentation of the bank letters of intention where relavant (see paragraph 
6- e); 
h) public auction (in most cases, on the Rio de Janeiro Stock Exchange); 
i) drawing up of the safes contract with the new owners; 
j) divulgence of the independent auditor's report. 
A complete privatization operation, carried out by BNDESPAR, took on aver-
age a period of 180 days, the last 70 days covering the period between the puhl ic a-
tion of the Sale Notices to the conclusion of the process. 
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Privatizations after Decree 91.991 of Nov/1985 
November/89 




















1 • Cia. Nacional de Tecidos Tardes 09106187 15.8 27.0 51 
1 	N.A. 17 Multifabril SIA 
Nova América Grupo Cataguazes-
leopoldina) 
2 • Máquinas Piratininga 
do Nordeste S/A 
Capital 
Goods 
23'07187 1.4 6.1 100 NA 4 Cia. de Cimento 
Portland Poty 
3- Máquinas Piratininga SIA Capital 
Goods 
15109187 0.1 1.4 97 44 97 2 Wuppertal Ind. 
de Máq. Ltda. 
4 - Siderúrgica N.S. Aparecida Steel 10112/87 12.9 67 !Alares Ind. de 
Base S/A • Vibasa 
5 • Sibra • Eletrosiderúrgica Ferro 47.6 
Brasileira SIA Alloys 
5.1- Share Capital Sale 11104188 29.0 310.0 57 18 11 Ferro•ligas 
do Norte SIA 
5.2 • Sale to Minority Voting 12/07/88 5.4 33 11 NKK/Marubeni 
Shareholders Corporation 
53 Special kution 22/12/88 13.2 53 Different Buyers 
6 • Aracruz Celulose SIA Pulp 156.2 - 
61 • Sale of Voting Shares 03105188 133.8 19.0 26 13 8 Albatroz SIA 
(Grupo Safra) 
6.2 • Secondary Sale 16106188 21.0 - 10 4 7,860 new 
shareholders 
6.3 • Stock Exchange Sale '03/03189 1.4 0.3 0.13 Different Buyers 
Cia. Guatapará de Celulose 
e Papel • Celpag 
Pulp 
and Paper 
09105188 72.7 90.0 67 54 SIA Indústrias 
Votorantim 
8 • Caraiba Metais SIA Copper 89.7 





Banco da Bahia 
de Investimentos SM 
8.2 • Class and Common 14111188 2.6 100 2.5 Different Buyers 
Stock Sale 
Sul•otal • I 3%.40 
N.A. - Not applicable 	 Continues 














































9 • Cimetal Siderurgia S.A. Steel 59.0 
9.1- Auction of Asseis 21111;88 48.9 29.00 
• Usina Barão de 
Cocais: Fazendas do 37.5 17.15 2 Grupo Gerdau 
Gama e Rio Pardo 
• Usina de João \leiva 
e Fazendas São Mateus 
e Mucuri 
11,2 100.18 3 Grupo lnonibrás 
• Fazendas Clementino 
I e II e Medeiros 
0.2 Orminas Repres. 
e Com. S/A 
9.2 • Sale of Remaining 13103189 9.9 
Assets 
• Usina Gusa 7 Lagoas 6.8 Ironbrás Ind. 
e Com. S.A. 
• Usina Gusa I 0.3 (mel • Metalurg. 
Freitas Ltda. 
• Usina Gusa II 1.3 2 A.R.G. Ltda. 
• Usina Gusa V 0.7 6 Construtora 
Fergoni Lida. 
• Usina Gusa VI 0.5 4 Construtora 
Fergoni Ltda. 
• Fazenda das 
Maravilhas 
0.1 10 Benigno Nabor 
da Silva 
93 • Auction o( the Fazenda 13103189 0.2 42.6 62.8 62.8 62.8 2 Silvio 1 Silveira 
São Francisco 
10 - Cia. Brasileira do Mining 2%3189 7.2 99.9 99.9 CBC Employees 
Cobre CBC 
11 • Cia. Ferro e Aço de Vitória 
Cofavi Steel 12107189 8.2 99.9 99,5 Duferco Trading S.A. 
12 - Cia. de Celulose da 
Bahia - CCB 
Pulp 17107189 14.4 14.28 99.9 95.4 99,5 7 Klabin Fabricadora 
de Papéis 
13 - Usina Siderúrgica da Steel 03110189 54.2 138.19 99.9 97.7 99.0 8 Troncosul 
Bahia 	Usiba Administração e 
Participações Ltda. 
(Grupo Gerdau) 
Sub-Total - II 143.0 





















Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social 
Av. República do Chile, 100 
CEP 20139-900 - Rio de Janeiro - RJ 
Telex: (21) 34110 - Tel.: (021) 277-7447 
Fax: (021) 220-6313 
FINAME — Agência Especial de Financiamento Industrial 
Av. República do Chile, 100 - 17? andar 
CEP 20139-900 - Rio de Janeiro - RJ 
Telex: (21) 34110 - Tel.: (021) 277-7447 
Fax: (021) 220-7909 
BNDESPAR — BNDES Participações S.A. 
Av. República do Chile, 100 - 20? andar 
CEP 20139-900 - Rio de Janeiro - RJ 
Telex: (21) 34110 - Tel.: (021) 277-7555 
Fax: (021) 220-7695 
OFFICES 
Brasília 
Setor Bancário Sul - Conj. 1 - Bloco E - 13? andar 
CEP 70070 - Brasília - DF 
Telex: (61) 1190 - Tel.: (061) 225-4350 
Fax: (061) 225-5179 
São Paulo 
Av. Paulista, 460 - 13? andar 
CEP 01310 - São Paulo - SP 
Telex: (11) 35568 - Tel.: (011) 251-5055 
Fax: (011) 251-5917 
Recife 
Rua Riachuelo, 105 - 7? andar 
CEP 50000 - Recife - PE 
Telex: (81) 2016 - Tel.: (081) 231-0200 
Fax: (081) 221-4983 
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